Consensus Treaties
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24036767 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Scott Barrett (0000-0001-5921-9830, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 158 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 529-547 |
| Publication date | 2002-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/0932456022975169 |
| OpenAlex | W4235608826 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
Treaties seeking to supply transnational public goods are usually modeled as a game in which cooperation is incomplete, with some countries participating and some not. This paper shows that, if the usual rationality concept is weakened somewhat, countries will often do better by negotiating a consensus treaty in which provision of the public good is chosen to maximize the collective payoff of all countries subject to participation in the treaty being full. The theory developed here thus explains when, and why, it may be better to negotiate a treaty that is »broad but shallow« rather than »narrow but deep.«
Pledge-and-Review Bargaining
The price of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol
Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy
Effective support for community resource management
Confronting the nitrogen challenge
Regional variation, holdouts, and climate treaty negotiations
Environmental cooperation
Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods
The International Law and Politics of Climate Change
Asylum Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2022 (17) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |