Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24037445 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andreas Blume (0000-0001-5295-295X), Paul Heidhues |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 164 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 163-184 |
| Publication date | 2008-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/jite-2008-0012 |
| OpenAlex | W4237771166 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
We study tacit collusion, which we interpret as collusion without communication about strategies, in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they have become named through winning an auction. We obtain two classes of results: (1) Completely refraining from using names rules out collusion altogether, and even if naming is permitted, as per our definition of tacit collusion, the lack of communication limits collusive strategies and payoffs among impatient bidders. (2) Sufficiently patient bidders can overcome the attainability constraints imposed by lack of communication and obtain approximately the same collusive gain as absent communication.
Business · Collusion · Common value auction · Economics · Industrial organization · Knowledge management · Microeconomics · Tacit collusion · Tacit knowledge · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2018 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |