Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids
Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10177705 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sylvain Chassang (New York University), Juan Ortner |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 127 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 2269-2300 |
| Publication date | 2018-12-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/701812 |
| OpenAlex | W3124125731 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 31 |
We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model’s predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data, where we find evidence that minimum prices weakened collusion. A robust design insight is that setting a minimum price at the bottom of the observed winning-bid distribution necessarily improves over a minimum price of zero
Auction theory · Bidding · Cartel · Collusion · Common value auction · Context (archaeology · Counterintuitive · Economics · Microeconomics · Procurement · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Public Procurement and Policy
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
Identification and Inference in Nonlinear Difference-in-Differences Models
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Optimal Auction Design
Relational Incentive Contracts
Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors
Deciding Between Competition and Collusion
Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |