Juan Ortner
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867566 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Juan Ortner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Juan |
| FAMILY NAME | Ortner |
| SIGNATURE | ORTNER J |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Mediated Collusion
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids
We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model’s predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data…
Making Corruption Harder
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the \nagent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and \nMartimort (1997) we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric \ninformation between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We \nshow it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved \npre-existing patte…
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids
We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model’s predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data…
Making Corruption Harder
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the \nagent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and \nMartimort (1997) we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric \ninformation between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We \nshow it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved \npre-existing patte…
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids
We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model’s predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data…
Making Corruption Harder
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the \nagent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and \nMartimort (1997) we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric \ninformation between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We \nshow it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved \npre-existing patte…
Mediated Collusion
Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Collusion (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Auction theory (1 works) · Bidding (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Cartel (1 works) · Common value auction (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works)