Making Corruption Harder
Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10175354 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Juan Ortner, Sylvain Chassang (New York University) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 126 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 2108-2133 |
| Publication date | 2018-06-12 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/699188 |
| OpenAlex | W2808151517 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 37 |
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the \nagent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and \nMartimort (1997) we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric \ninformation between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We \nshow it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved \npre-existing patterns of private information. We provide a data-driven framework for \npolicy evaluation requiring only unverified reports. A potential local policy change is \nan improvement if, everything else equal, it is associated with greater reports of crime
Business · Collusion · Computer security · Economics · Incentive · Information asymmetry · Language change · Microeconomics · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Private information retrieval · Public economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Finance · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
Corruption in Developing Countries
Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms
The Power of Political Voice
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Obtaining a Driver's License in India
Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing
On Transparency in Organizations
When the guards guard themselves
Tax Rates and Tax Evasion
Monitoring Corruption
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |