Sylvain Chassang
Biographic Data
| ID | 5868097 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sylvain Chassang |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sylvain |
| FAMILY NAME | Chassang |
| SIGNATURE | CHASSANG S |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 34 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids
We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model’s predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data…
Making Corruption Harder
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the \nagent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and \nMartimort (1997) we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric \ninformation between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We \nshow it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved \npre-existing patte…
Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event of an intervention. In this setting intervention policies that are very responsive to the monitor's message provide very informative signals to the agent,…
Economic Shocks and Civil War
This article revisits the relationship between income per capita and civil conflict. We begin by documenting that the empirical literature identifies two different patterns. First, poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries suffer negative income shocks. In a formal model we examine an explanation often suggested in the informal literature: civil wars occur in poor countries because t…
Economic Shocks and Civil War
This article revisits the relationship between income per capita and civil conflict. We begin by documenting that the empirical literature identifies two different patterns. First, poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries suffer negative income shocks. In a formal model we examine an explanation often suggested in the informal literature: civil wars occur in poor countries because t…
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids
We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model’s predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data…
Making Corruption Harder
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the \nagent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and \nMartimort (1997) we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric \ninformation between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We \nshow it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved \npre-existing patte…
Economic Shocks and Civil War
This article revisits the relationship between income per capita and civil conflict. We begin by documenting that the empirical literature identifies two different patterns. First, poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries suffer negative income shocks. In a formal model we examine an explanation often suggested in the informal literature: civil wars occur in poor countries because t…
Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event of an intervention. In this setting intervention policies that are very responsive to the monitor's message provide very informative signals to the agent,…
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids
We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model’s predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data…
Making Corruption Harder
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the \nagent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and \nMartimort (1997) we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric \ninformation between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We \nshow it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved \npre-existing patte…
Corruption and Economic Development (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Collusion (2 works) · Language change (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Agricultural risk and resilience (1 works)