Auctions Beat Posted Prices in a Small Market
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24039704 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Benoit Julien, Benoı̂t Julien (0000-0002-3993-9854), Ian King (0000-0003-2505-8033), John Kennes (0000-0002-1953-477X) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 158 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 548-562 |
| Publication date | 2002-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/0932456022975259 |
| OpenAlex | W2093054620 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
In a model with two buyers and sellers we consider the choice of sales mechanism from three possibilities: posted prices, and auctions with and without reserve prices. With homogenous goods, sellers' expected revenues are highest when both sellers auction with reserve prices - 33% higher than if posting prices and 100% higher than if auctioning without reserve prices. When sellers can choose their mechanism before choosing prices, both sellers auction with a reserve price in the dominant strategy equilibrium. With heterogenous goods, the equilibrium with posted prices is inefficient (MONTGOMERY [1991]) but the equilibria with both types of auctions are efficient.
Beat (acoustics) · Business · Common value auction · Economics · Financial economics · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Highly cited | No |
|---|