An Experimental Test of Sabotage in Tournaments

Bibliographic Data

ID24041643
AuthorsDonald Vandegrift (0000-0003-1267-6713), Abdullah Yavas (0000-0002-8863-1493)
Year2010
Volume166
Issue2
Pages259-285
Publication date2010-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559
PublisherMohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1628/093245610791343012
OpenAlexW1971740606
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited12

We use a real-effort task to investigate the responsiveness of both sabotage and performance in a tournament to: (1) changes in the payoff structure of the tournament, and (2) changes in the identity of competitors over a series of tournaments (rematching versus constant pairings). Constant pairings shows significantly lower performance than rematching because of weak performance by low-ability participants. Constant pairings also depresses the rate at which participants choose sabotage, but causes higher sabotage levels given that the sabotage option is selected. Finally, sabotage is used far less effectively in the constant-pairings than it is in the rematching condition.

Test (biology) · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Geology · Psychology

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