Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24037432 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christine Harbring (0000-0002-5011-8117, University of Bonn), Bernd Irlenbusch (0000-0002-3433-2826, University of Bonn, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 161 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 636-663 |
| Publication date | 2005-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245605775075951 |
| OpenAlex | W3121141452 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 13 |
Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and are intended thereby to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to degrade the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position. We investigate whether this sabotage problem is mitigated in a repeated interaction between the agents and the principal. As sabotage can hardly be observed in real-world organizations, we employ a controlled experiment. Our data provide clear evidence that agents' behavior is not only guided by competition between agents but also by the possibility of punishing the principal via sabotage.
Biology · Economics · Endogeny · Incentive · Microeconomics · Selection (genetic algorithm) · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Biochemistry · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
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Combining Egalitarian and Proportional Sharing Rules in Team Tournaments to Incentivize Energy-Efficient Behavior in a Principal-Agent Context
Sabotage in contests
Sabotage in team contests
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device
Performance in Competitive Environments
Prizes and Incentives
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Erc
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Pay Equality and Industrial Politics
Tournaments and Piece Rates
The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Incentives in Organizations
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.38 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2024 (15) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |