Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets

What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?

Bibliographic Data

ID24048224
AuthorsGiovanni Anania (University of Calabria), Rosanna Nisticò (0000-0002-7001-5596, University of Calabria)
Year2004
Volume160
Issue4
Pages681-701
Publication date2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559
PublisherMohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1628/0932456042776113
OpenAlexW2258886617
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited8

Most food products can be classified as credence goods, and regulations exist to provide consumers with a substitute for the lacking information and trust. Rather than having no regulation in place, producers of high-quality goods are better off when a compromise is reached that leads to an imperfect regulation. Some of the producers of low-quality goods benefit by cheating under a not fully credible regulation. Even producers of low-quality goods who will never label their products as being of high quality may profit from the introduction of an imperfect regulation.

Blind trust · Business · Commerce · Computer security · Internet privacy · Political science · Public relations · Public trust · Quality (philosophy) · Computer Science · Marketing · Merger and Competition Analysis · Organic Food and Agriculture · Wine Industry and Tourism

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