Job Hoarding
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24050641 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew J Baker (0000-0002-1573-4889), Ingmar Nyman |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 173 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 688-722 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245617x14860182052051 |
| OpenAlex | W4256210180 |
| Language | EN |
We study a labor market in which employers and workers search for a trading partner, and workers have private information about the value of a match. We show that competitive pressure can induce workers to take jobs for which they are ill suited. This leads to insufficient frictional unemployment and search, and lower average productivity and utility. A fully tax-financed unemployment benefit can eliminate the inefficiency. Moreover, because inefficient job hoarding by workers occurs when there are many workers per job, the analysis suggests a novel explanation for the stylized macroeconomic fact that labor productivity is procyclical. (JEL: D24, D82, D83, E32, J64)
Hoarding (animal behavior) · Employment and Welfare Studies · Internal Medicine · Medicine · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|