A New Explanation for the Conflict Between Constructivist and Objectivist Grounded Theory
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 2410911 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kerem Coşkun (0000-0002-3343-2112) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Publication date | 2020-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Qualitative Methods (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1609-4069 • E-ISSN: 1609-4069 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1609406920938280 |
| OpenAlex | W3044515496 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 5 |
The purpose of this article is to produce a new explanation for the conflict between constructivist grounded theory and objectivist grounded theory. Grounded theory (GT) has drawn much attention because it enables qualitative researchers to produce theoretical explanations about what is going on. Since Glaser and Strauss invented the term 'grounded theory,' there have been debates about what grounded theory is and what are its components. In this article, epistemological, ontological, and methodological beliefs about constructivist and objectivist grounded theory are explained and compared, and definitional analytical aspects of the two approaches are addressed by emphasizing their paradigmatic roots. As a result, it was concluded that objectivistic grounded theory is an agreement between positivism and the naturalistic approach advocating that researchers can be value laden but must stay as objective as possible. On the other hand, it is proposed that constructivist grounded theory is a value-laden logical operation in producing theoretical explanations
Constructivism (international relations · Constructivist grounded theory · Epistemology · Grounded theory · Objectivism · Positivism · Qualitative research · Social science · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Qualitative Research Methods and Applications · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |