Dados Bibliográficos

AUTOR(ES) Z. Wang , F. Guo , H. Tang , Y. Zhong
AFILIAÇÃO(ÕES) Macau University of Science and Technology, Taipa, Macau, Dongguan University of Technology, Guangdong, China
ANO 2019
TIPO Artigo
PERIÓDICO SAGE Open
ISSN 2158-2440
E-ISSN 2158-2440
DOI 10.1177/2158244019870536
CITAÇÕES 4
ADICIONADO EM 2025-08-18
MD5 a71d04190a3cba7165a3335612532037

Resumo

With the rapid development of e-commerce, logistics distribution has become the bottleneck of its development. It is urgent to study how to optimize the cooperation between e-commerce platforms and logistics service providers. Based on Stackelberg game theory, this research first studies the decision making of two-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of the e-commerce mall and the logistics service provider without cooperative distribution, in which decentralization and centralization are analyzed, respectively. Then, it is extended to the decision making of three-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of e-commerce malls, express delivery companies, and terminal distributors. The results show that the profit, sales volume, and logistics service effort of the centralized decision-making system are higher than those of the decentralized decision-making system, regardless of the two-stage or three-stage logistics service supply chain. Therefore, it is vital to formulate a reasonable profit distribution scheme based on revenue-sharing contract to achieve the cooperation among the partners of logistics service supply chain, so as to achieve a win-win situation in which all of their profits increase. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the results, and some issues are proposed for future research.

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