From Contention to Clientelism
Evidence from the Ten-Year Fishing Ban in China
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24224575 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jingping Liu (0000-0002-3916-9618, Hong Kong Polytechnic University) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 266 |
| Pages | 385-399 |
| Publication date | 2026-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The China Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0009-4439 • E-ISSN: 1468-2648 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s030574102610215x |
| OpenAlex | W7154112202 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 49 |
How do ordinary Chinese people circumvent unpopular state policies? The existing literature primarily focuses on resistance against local bureaucrats. Drawing on ethnographic research on the ten-year fishing ban in the Yangtze River Basin, this article finds that fishermen (clients) continue to fish by maintaining patron–client relationships with the enforcers of the fishing ban (patrons). Ordinary fishermen seek the protection of enforcers through bribery. Enhanced state monitoring under the fishing ban facilitates bribery-based clientelism by weakening the fishermen’s everyday resistance, but it also constrains the power of enforcers by increasing the risk that their corruption will be discovered by upper-level authorities. For extremely poor fishermen, who are barely able to afford to pay bribes, their daily acts of resistance are morally justified by the need for subsistence safety, presenting enforcers with a dilemma: they must fulfil their law enforcement duties while also ensuring the survival of these individuals to maintain social stability. Therefore, cultivating a clientelist relationship with impoverished fishermen enables enforcers to manage their noncompliance, thereby balancing these conflicting goals. While clientelism protects people from unpopular policies to some extent, it more fundamentally strengthens the power of local bureaucrats, creating the potential for greater exploitation and larger-scale popular grievances in the long run.
bribery · Clientelism · Corruption · fishermen · fishing ban · popular grievances · Poverty · social stability · state enforcement · state monitoring · subsistence · Yangtze River Basin · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Corruption and Economic Development · Politics and Society in Latin America
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| Highly cited | No |
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