The Rational Paradigm in Political Science
Persistent Anomalies and the Role of Sociology
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 2517552 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adriano Pappalardo (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 228 |
| Publication date | 1991-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Sociological Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0735-2751 • E-ISSN: 1467-9558 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/202086 |
| OpenAlex | W2323508499 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 6 |
The first case is of voting, prediction according to which nobody should go to polls, or at best that abstentions should prevail massively, if voting decisions are rational. The early solutions to this paradox were efforts at modifying individual utility functions with various constraints.1 These solutions came to be seen as largely arbitrary and unfruitful. In mid-1970s a more sophisticated was proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina, who focused instead upon definition of information available to decision-makers (1974, p. 525). They stipulated that voting takes place within conditions of uncertainty, rather than of risk, as previously assumed. Because uncertainty implies that probabilities attached to different outcomes are unknown, this stipulation implies that voters cannot calculate their utility functions in order to make a decision. Ferejohn and Fiorina argued, however, that they can rationally minimize their maximal losses (or at least their maximal regret). Maximal loss would be that one's preferred party could be defeated by just one defection. Everybody would vote, even with a very small personal incentive, if they sought to minimize this of maximal regret. The paradox of voting thus disappears through a legitimate innovation within paradigm, consistent with paradigm's positive heuristic (Moon 1975, pp. 202-204). Or does it disappear? Uncertainty implies that probabilities attached to alternative outcomes are unknown. Yet Ferejohn and Fiorina initially proposed to calculate regret as the difference between what an actor could have won if correctly informed in advance, and what he/she actually gets from his/her choice (1974, p. 528). By definition, however, unknown probabilities eliminate of weighing probability that voter's party will be defeated and accordingly of establishing value of his or her vote. Later, perhaps to avoid this consequence, Ferejohn and Fiorina introduce logical possibility of defeat by one vote mentioned above in order to solve problem (1974, p. 535). They provide several (quite convincing) examples of circumstances under which this reason is a psychologically plausible motivation. Yet neither examples nor authors' treatment of topic are truly rigorous or truly able to deal with key question. Their efforts would have been successful as cases of intraparadigmatic puzzle solving if, and only if, a solution (in
Computer security · Economics · Epistemology · Heuristic · Incentive · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · nobody · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Regret · Stipulation · Voting · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,07 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 1999 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |