Rationality-in-Relations

Bibliographic Data

ID2802408
AuthorsHans Bernhard Schmid (0000-0002-8951-2859, corresponding author)
Year2003
Volume62
Issue1
Pages67-101
Publication date2003-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Economics and Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-9246 • E-ISSN: 1536-7150
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1536-7150.t01-1-00003
OpenAlexW2082070533
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited28

If in a game with multiple proper coordination equilibria there is a single one that is best for all participants, it isrationalfor each participant to choose the strategy that has the best equilibrium as one of its possible outcomes. This seems so obvious that any plausible theory of rationality should be expected to be applicable to such situations. However, this is not true for the "orthodox" theory of rational choice, as Robert Sugden has convincingly shown. In this paper, I shall argue that this failure is due to an implicit individualistic understanding ofintentionality. John R. Searle's concept ofcollective intentionality(as put forth in hisConstruction of Social Reality) and his more recent theory ofRationality in Actionprovides important conceptual tools pertaining to a more comprehensive theory of rationality. The account I shall develop differs from Searle's own, as for reasons to be found in his overall project, Searle's departure from the orthodox view of rationality gets stuck half-way

Action (physics) · Ecological rationality · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Intentionality · Mathematical economics · Positive political theory · Principle of rationality · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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