Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized

Bibliographic Data

ID2806773
AuthorsAnthoniew M Meijers (Eindhoven University of Technology, corresponding author)
Year2003
Volume62
Issue1
Pages167-183
Publication date2003-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Economics and Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-9246 • E-ISSN: 1536-7150
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1536-7150.t01-1-00006
OpenAlexW2104250283
LanguageEN
Citations received23
References cited11

Searle's philosophical construction of social reality has three basic "building blocks": collective intentionality, constitutive rules, and the imposition of functions. This article will focus on the first of these, collective intentionality, which is taken to be the central span on the bridge from physics to society. Searle analyzes this notion in terms of his own internalist theory of intentionality. In his view, we could have all the collective intentionality we have even if we were a brain in a vat, i.e., even if we were radically mistaken about the outside world. It will be argued that such an internalist view of collective intentionality cannot capture normative aspects of social phenomena. Social reality requires a radical relational approach

Bridge (graph theory) · Epistemology · Externalism · Focus (optics) · Intentionality · Internalism and externalism · Normative · Sociology · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub