Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality

Bibliographic Data

ID2811685
AuthorsL A Zaibert, Leo Zaibert (0000-0002-0921-2777, University of Wisconsin–Parkside, corresponding author)
Year2003
Volume62
Issue1
Pages209-232
Publication date2003-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Economics and Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-9246 • E-ISSN: 1536-7150
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1536-7150.t01-1-00008
OpenAlexW2061755022
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited7

John Searle believes that collective intentions are crucial to his philosophy, but he is yet to present a coherent account of these entities. No account whatsoever of collective intentions is presented in the book where Searle needs them the most (The Construction of Social Reality), or, for that matter, in any other of Searle's major books. The only account, and a defective one at that (so I argue), is found in a short, somewhat obscure article entitled "Collective Intentions and Actions," but in fact what Searle presents there is, at best, an account of collective actions, not of collective intentions. In light of Searle own ground-breaking work in the philosophy of mind, and in particular in light of his far-reaching analyses showing how intentions differ from related mental states, I argue that collective intentions are not consistent with Searle's philosophy of mind

Collective behavior · Collective responsibility · Epistemology · Intentionality · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Social science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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