South Korean Labor Market Discrimination Against Women

Estimating Its Cost

Bibliographic Data

ID2818304
AuthorsElizabeth Monk-Turner (0000-0003-1882-6946, Old Dominion University), Elizabeth Monk‐turner, Charlie G Turner, Charlie Turner (Old Dominion University)
Year1994
Volume53
Issue4
Pages433-442
Publication date1994-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Economics and Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-9246 • E-ISSN: 1536-7150
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1536-7150.1994.tb02615.x
OpenAlexW2128092986
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited4

South Korean chaebols (large family owned firms) have extensive government ties which provide them with favorable treatment. In turn, the government obtains support from the chaebols. The chaebols have gained economic or excess profits through exploiting monopolistic power in the domestic South Korean product market and through exploiting monopsonistic power in the domestic factor market.How a monopsonistic firm obtains excess profits is illustrated and related to the behavior of the chaebols as a whole. Major focus is on the labor market. The chaebols have discretionary power over how to exploit their monopsonistic position. The status of women in the South Korean work force in light of this discretionary power is considered. An estimate of the income loss involved is made

Business · Economics · Exploit · Factor market · Government (linguistics) · Labour economics · Market power · Microeconomics · Monopolistic competition · Monopoly · Monopsony · Asian Industrial and Economic Development · Labor Movements and Unions · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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