Informal Institutions and Horizontal Accountability

Protocols in the Chilean Budgetary Process

Bibliographic Data

ID2989324
AuthorsIgnacio Arana Araya (0000-0002-8251-5598, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume55
Issue04
Pages74-94
Publication date2013-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLatin American Politics and Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1531-426X • E-ISSN: 1548-2456
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00215.x
OpenAlexW2082820251
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited22

Studies of executive-legislative relations are usually based only on the analysis of formal institutions, although informal institutions also shape interbranch behavior. This omission leads to questionable results when scholars examine the capacity of state institutions to audit other public agencies and branches of government. This article explores how the protocols, an informal institution that shapes the Chilean budgetary negotiations, have increasingly allowed the congress to have a more relevant budgetary role than what the constitution permits. It argues that protocols accommodate some of the undesired consequences of a charter that is strongly biased toward the central government, and describes how this institution has departed from its stringent budgetary focus to encompass broader executive-legislative agreements that enhance the legislature's capacity to oversee the executive

Accountability · Audit · Budget process · Business · Charter · Constitution · Institution · Legislature · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Public institution · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration · Accounting

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