Opting for Exit
Informalization, Social Policy Discontent, and Lack of Good Governance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 2995121 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sarah Beren (0000-0001-5188-3569, University of Cologne, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 1-28 |
| Publication date | 2020-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Latin American Politics and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1531-426X • E-ISSN: 1548-2456 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/lap.2019.58 |
| OpenAlex | W3013196386 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 47 |
The informal sector challenges economic growth and hinders the abatement of income disparities in developing countries. This study argues that a weak and poorly governed welfare state can cause the informal sector to increase when individuals use it as an exit option from an unsatisfying welfare system. The article explores how the welfare state's benefit structure and citizens' trust in institutions to deliver public goods affect the likelihood of informality. A logistic hierarchical model, based on cross-sectional survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean and descriptive panel data from Brazil, is used to test the hypothesis. Findings reveal that social policy discontent, low trust, an elitist distribution of welfare benefits, and dysfunctional institutions increase the likelihood of being informally employed. However, workers with greater agency-the better-educated-seem notably less likely to informalize when social policy benefits are targeted toward their own socioeconomic group
Business · Corporate governance · Development economics · Dysfunctional family · Economic growth · Economics · Informal sector · Market economy · Panel data · Political science · Population · Public economics · Public good · Social protection · Socioeconomic status · Sociology · Welfare · Welfare state · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Taxation and Compliance Studies · Finance
Labor Informality and Economic Political Accountability of Executive Incumbents in Latin America
Fairness and Tax Morale in Developing Countries
Classrooms or Crackdowns? How Violence Affects Security Policy Preferences in Mexico
Does clientelism hinder progressive social policy in Latin America
Informalities
Emigration, Social Remittances and Fiscal Policy Preferences
Opting for Exit
The Right and the Politics of Labor Informality Enforcement
Varieties of Economic Vulnerability
The Quality of Government
Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models
The economics of the informal sector
Why do people pay taxes?
The Regulation of Entry
Dodging the grabbing hand
Income tax evasion
The other path
Informality
Social Protection and the Market in Latin America
Government Effectiveness and Regional Variation in Informal Employment
Democracy and the Left
The Worldwide Governance Indicators
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America
Dualism and support for the welfare state
Is the Informal Sector Politically Different? (Null) Answers from Latin America
Informal Employment
Defining and estimating underground and informal economies
Informal employment in developing countries
What causes firms to hide output? The determinants of informality
The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on the shadow economy
Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data—or tears
Tax morale in Latin America
The Externalities of Inequality
Diminished Expectations
Easy and Hard Redistribution
Development, Trade, and Social Insurance1
Social Protection Around the World
Modeling Multilevel Data Structures
Preferences on Redistribution in Fragmented Labor Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean
Labor Divides, Informality, and Regulation
Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract
Informality Revisited
Between exclusion and calculating solidarity? Preferences for private versus public welfare provision and the size of the informal sector
Coalitional realignment and the adoption of non-contributory social insurance programmes in Latin America
Economic Vulnerability and Partisanship in Latin America
Opting for Exit
Hooking Workers and Hooking Votes
Social Protection for the Poorest
Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |