What would a Bourdieuan sociology of scientific truth look like

Bibliographic Data

ID3067656
AuthorsKyung-Man Kim (0000-0001-9826-7747, Sogang University, Seoul, Korea,), Kyung‐man Kim (0000-0002-6760-2319, Sogang University, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume48
Issue1
Pages57-79
Publication date2009-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSocial Science Information (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0539-0184 • E-ISSN: 1461-7412
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0539018408099637
OpenAlexW2159169000
LanguageEN
Citations received18
References cited36

In his last lecture delivered at the Collège de France, Pierre Bourdieu criticizes relativist sociology of science for failing to capture the truly social logic of scientific practice and asserts that his argument of 30 years ago can still work as a corrective to the relativist sociology of science. However, Bourdieu's critics concur that his field theory of science is not only theoretically defunct but also empirically deficient. In this article, I do two things. First, after showing why, in Bourdieu's field theory of science, the distinction between the two explanatory categories deployed by the relativists dissolves, I argue that, contrary to the critics' claims, Bourdieu's field theory of science has the distinctively Bourdieuan elements that sharply distinguish it not only from the Mertonian/Habermasian idealistic view of science but also from that of relativist sociology of science. The second part of this article discusses a sociological study of scientific practice and indicates the way in which Bourdieu's theoretical arguments can be empirically substantiated

Epistemology · Mathematical sociology · Philosophy of science · Relativism · Science studies · Social science · Sociology · Sociology of knowledge · Sociology of scientific knowledge · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Management and Organizational Studies · Mathematics · Philosophy · Social and Cultural Dynamics

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