When the Party Accused of a Crime is the President
The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office and the US "ad hoc" Prosecutor
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3075101 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fábio Kerche (0000-0002-0503-6446, Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 641-659 |
| Publication date | 2020-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Novos Estudos - CEBRAP (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0101-3300 • E-ISSN: 1980-5403 |
| Publisher | Novos Estudos - CEBRAP (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.25091/s01013300202000030011 |
| OpenAlex | W3115759067 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 11 |
This essay analyzes the prosecution models espoused in Brazil and in the US when the accused party is the president. Both the head of the Brazil’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and the American prosecutor, ad hoc, were given a high degree of autonomy, which was reduced after scandals. Between the “autonomy to fight corruption” or “stability in the political system”, the latter prevailed after experiments with autonomous prosecutors
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |