Allocating Defensive Resources with Private Information about Vulnerability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3131869 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Powell (0000-0003-2768-0555, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 799-809 |
| Publication date | 2007-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055407070530 |
| OpenAlex | W2151056235 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 13 |
In many resources-allocation problems, strategic adversaries move sequentially and are likely to have private information about the effectiveness of their spending. A defender, for example, often has to allocate its defensive resources before an attacker (e.g., a terrorist group) decides where to strike. Defenders are also likely to have private information about the vulnerability of the things they are trying to protect. Sequential decisions and private information about effectiveness creates a dilemma for a defender. Allocating more to a highly vulnerable site reduces the expected losses should that site be attacked but may also signal that that site is more vulnerable and thereby increase the probability of an attack. Modeling this tradeoff as a signaling game, the analysis shows that secrecy concerns generally swamp vulnerability concerns when more vulnerable sites are weakly harder to protect on the margin. The defender pools in equilibrium, that is, allocates its resources in the same way, regardless of the level of vulnerability. If more vulnerable sites are easier to protect on the margin, vulnerability concerns may swamp secrecy concerns
Business · Computer security · Dilemma · Internet privacy · Margin (machine learning · Private information retrieval · Secrecy · Vulnerability (computing · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Game Theory and Applications · Political Conflict and Governance
Wars of Conquest and Independence
Does Terrorism Work?
The attack and defense of weakest-link networks
Simultaneous Battles and Sequential Battles in Bargaining Models of War
Dynamic Inconsistency in Counterterrorism
The fragility of deterrence in conflicts
Bilateral Conflict
Simple analytics of the impact of terror generation on attacker–defender interactions
More Is Not Always Better
Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests
National Responses to Transnational Terrorism
Counter-Suicide-Terrorism
Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Counterterrorism
Governance of Terror
Citizen Information, Electoral Incentives, and Provision of Counter-Terrorism
Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,94 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2024 (16) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |