Demagogues in American Politics by Charles U. Zug

The rise of authoritarian and charismatic populists has given rise to interdisciplinary interest in the vexed topic of demagogues—a term that has long had multiple definitions. Initially, it was a neutral term, meaning someone who was a leader of the Athenian non-elite (the demes). For classical authors like Aristophanes or Thucydides, a demagogue might be good (Pericles) or bad (Cleon). In Rhetoric, Aristotle seems to characterize a demagogue by rhetorical strategy (flattery), but in Politics, a demagogue is almost a structural phenomenon, arising when the rich oppress the poor. For an elitist like Plutarch, a demagogue was necessarily a rash and irresponsible aspiring tyrant. In short, even among “classical” treatments of demagoguery, there were conflicting ways of identifying a demagogue, such as political power base, motive, rhetorical strategies, policy agenda. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. Thus, when talking about a demagogue or demagoguery, the first question should be: What definition are we using?Zug’s Demagogues in American Politics is an engaging and useful argument for one way of distinguishing harmful from beneficial demagoguery. Focusing on demagogues as political figures, he argues that the U.S. Constitution implies certain rhetorical standards for various official positions and that, to some extent, the appropriateness of demagogic practices depends on the extent to which a rhetor is advocating a position that can be defended reasonably and inclusively. It is somewhat puzzling that Zug seems to assume that there is a stable and eternal definition of the term (and that Plutarch represents the classical tradition), but his argument that its consequences are not always the same is intelligent and sensible.He says, “Demagoguery’s defining characteristic is that it leverages sources of human motivation without supplying reasons for why someone who is not already committed to pursuing a certain end ought to be. Characteristically, demagogues speak as though their audiences know already that the positions being taken and the measures being proposed are necessary and just, and they withhold reasons for why they should be understood as necessary and just” (64). Although there may not be much harm in a belligerent uncle arguing that way at Thanksgiving, it is clearly far more harmful on the part of a president.Zug makes his argument through a series of close textual and historical analyses, with the most impressive chapter being his discussion of how our understanding of the role of the supposed demagogue Daniel Shays in “Shays’ Rebellion” is itself the consequence of demagoguery. His analyses of Trump’s speeches and comparison to FDR’s fireside chats are particularly persuasive for his overall argument that demagoguery is not about the morality of the rhetor.There are a few nits one might pick in Zug’s argument. It would be stronger were he to clarify which definition of demagoguery he is using. As mentioned above, there is not one classical tradition regarding demagogues, and characterizing the cause and harm of demagoguery as structural (rather than moral) was a strand in political philosophy going back to Thucydides’ description of the “Mytilenean Debate.” The classical tradition in which the founders were trained divided rhetoric into three kinds: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Deliberative rhetoric was supposed to be agonistic but reasonable, whereas both forensic and epideictic might drift into what Zug considers demagogic. Hence, one might say that Zug’s definition of rhetoric is too narrow (it is not just concerned with compliance gaining) and demagoguery too broad (since it includes the entire genre of epideictic).But those are quibbles. Zug’s goal was, as a political scientist, to intervene thoughtfully in a debate about what is and is not an antidemocratic way to advocate policies. Much of the criticism of authoritarian populists’ rhetoric does seem to be both elitist and rationalist, and much of the defense of that rhetoric relies on characterizations of rhetors’ morality and motives (or attacks on “the other side”). What Zug provides is a way of thinking about democratic deliberation in terms of roles and responsibilities, terms that are likely to lead to much more useful disagreements about how we should disagree

Political science · Politics · American Constitutional Law and Politics · History · Law