Intrinsic Social Incentives in State and Non-State Armed Groups

Bibliographic Data

ID3280349
AuthorsMichael J Gilligan (0000-0003-3881-1717, New York University, corresponding author), Prabin Khadka (0000-0002-1921-5242, University of Essex, corresponding author), Cyrus Samii (0000-0002-0823-1319, New York University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume117
Issue1
Pages22-41
Publication date2023-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s000305542200020x
OpenAlexW4224307008
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited54

How do non-state armed groups (NSAGs) survive and even thrive in situations where state armed groups (SAGs) collapse, despite the former's often greater material adversity? We argue that, optimizing under their different constraints, SAGs invest more in technical military training and NSAGs invest more in enhancing soldiers' intrinsic payoffs from serving their group. Therefore, willingness to contribute to the group should be more positively correlated with years of service in NSAGs than in SAGs. We confirm this hypothesis with lab-in-the-field and qualitative evidence from SAG and NSAG soldiers in Nepal, Ivory Coast, and Kurdistan. Each field study addresses specific inferential weaknesses in the others. Assembled together, these cases reduce concerns about external validity or replicability. Our findings reveal how the basis of NSAG cohesion differs from that of SAGs, with implications for strategies to counter NSAG mobilization

Business · Cohesion (chemistry · Economics · Group cohesiveness · Incentive · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Public relations · State (computer science · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Gender, Security, and Conflict · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology

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