Saltar al contenido principal

ETHNOS_APP

Inicio • Búsqueda • Revistas • Lista 0

Wages and Recruitment

Evidence from External Wage Changes

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3301247
AutoresTorberg Falch (0000-0002-8850-6908, Torberg Falch is a Professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology., autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen70
Número2
Páginas483-518
Fecha de publicación2017-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0019793916651040
OpenAlexW3121279250
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas21

In this article, the author estimates the causal effect of the wage level on the recruitment rate in establishments. During the 1990s, the wage setting for certified teachers in Norway was completely centralized, with a state-paid wage premium of about 10% at some schools with severe recruitment problems. The empirical approach exploits within-school variation in wage-premium eligibility and that actual teacher supply is empirically observed at schools with excess demand for teachers. In a difference-in-differences framework, the wage premium increases the recruitment rate by 6 to 7 percentage points. This finding is robust to model specification and indicates that the recruitment elasticity to the wage is equal to the separation elasticity in absolute terms. The implied short-run labor-supply elasticity for individual establishments is about 1.4. It is also evidence of a diminishing return to scale in recruitment activity, a central assumption in search-theoretic models of imperfect competition in the labor market

Competition (biology) · Econometrics · Economics · Efficiency wage · Elasticity (physics) · Exploit · Imperfect · Imperfect competition · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Monopsony · Price elasticity of demand · Supply and demand · Wage · Economic Policies and Impacts · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · School Choice and Performance

  • Teacher Recruitment and Retention

    Open Access•Beng Huat See, Rebecca Morris et al.•Education Sciences•2020

  • Do Employers Have More Monopsony Power in Slack Labor Markets

    Open Access•Bertrand Hirsch, Boris Hirsch et al.•Industrial and Labor Relations…•2018

  • Monopsony in Labor Markets

    Open Access•Anna Sokolova, Todd Sorensen•Industrial and Labor Relations…•2021

  • Monopsony in Motion

    Alan Manning•Monopsony in Motion•2013

  • Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market

    Richard Rogerson, Robert Shimer et al.•Journal of Economic Literature•2005

  • Strengthening State Capabilities

    Ernesto Dal Bó, Frederico Finan et al.•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2013

  • Would higher salaries keep teachers in high-poverty schools? Evidence from a policy intervention in North Carolina

    Open Access•Charles T Clotfelter, Charles Clotfelter et al.•Journal of Public Economics•2008

  • Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement

    Open Access•Steven G Rivkin, Eric A Hanushek et al.•Econometrica•2005

  • Chapter 2 Female labor supply

    Mark R Killingsworth, James J Heckman•Handbook of Labor Economics…•1986

  • Mostly Harmless Econometrics

    Joshua D Angrist, Jorn‐steffen Pischke et al.•Mostly Harmless Econometrics•2009

  • Monopsony in the Low-Wage Labor Market? Evidence from Minimum Nurse Staffing Regulations

    Jordan Matsudaira, Jordan D Matsudaira•The Review of Economics and…•2014

  • A Generalised Model of Monopsony

    Open Access•Alan Manning•The Economic Journal•2006

  • The Determinants of Queues for Federal Jobs

    Open Access•Alan B Krueger•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1988

Obras citantes distintas3
Citas por año0,38
Intervalo de citas2018 - 2021 (4)
Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 3
Ethnos_APP • Proyecto Open Source • Licencia MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidad y Cookies • Documentación de la API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código de la API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código del Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae