Wages and Recruitment

Evidence from External Wage Changes

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3301247
AutoresTorberg Falch (0000-0002-8850-6908, Torberg Falch is a Professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology., autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen70
Número2
Páginas483-518
Fecha de publicación2017-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0019793916651040
OpenAlexW3121279250
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas21

In this article, the author estimates the causal effect of the wage level on the recruitment rate in establishments. During the 1990s, the wage setting for certified teachers in Norway was completely centralized, with a state-paid wage premium of about 10% at some schools with severe recruitment problems. The empirical approach exploits within-school variation in wage-premium eligibility and that actual teacher supply is empirically observed at schools with excess demand for teachers. In a difference-in-differences framework, the wage premium increases the recruitment rate by 6 to 7 percentage points. This finding is robust to model specification and indicates that the recruitment elasticity to the wage is equal to the separation elasticity in absolute terms. The implied short-run labor-supply elasticity for individual establishments is about 1.4. It is also evidence of a diminishing return to scale in recruitment activity, a central assumption in search-theoretic models of imperfect competition in the labor market

Competition (biology) · Econometrics · Economics · Efficiency wage · Elasticity (physics) · Exploit · Imperfect · Imperfect competition · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Monopsony · Price elasticity of demand · Supply and demand · Wage · Economic Policies and Impacts · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · School Choice and Performance