Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3353672 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William R Clark (0000-0002-4685-2626, New York University), Mark Hallerberg (0000-0002-4617-9929, University of Pittsburgh) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 94 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 323-346 |
| Publication date | 2000-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2586015 |
| OpenAlex | W2116876416 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 103 |
| References cited | 69 |
The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: Capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe
Capital (architecture · Capital flows · Economics · Exchange rate · Exchange-rate regime · Fiscal policy · Fiscal union · Inflation targeting · International economics · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary hegemony · Monetary policy · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data
The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy
Globalization of Capital and National Policymaking
Political‐Economic Cycles
Fiscal Governance in Europe
Global Capital and National Governments
The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries
Politischer Opportunismus und Haushaltsdefizite in den westdeutschen Bundesländern
Globalization and Mass Politics
Electoral cycles in tax reforms
Political monetary cycles
Democratic institutions and regulatory privileges for government debt
Temporary Payoffs or Trade Policy Priorities? Congressional Support for Trade Adjustment Assistance
Presidential Electoral Cycles and Corruption Charges
Who Decides? Coalition Governance and Ministerial Discretion
Capital Controls, Political Institutions, and Economic Growth
Democratic Accountability in Open Economies
Capital markets and tax policy making
Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability
Single-party government, Prime Minister psychology, and the diversionary use of force
Finding political capital for monetary tightening
Election cycles in natural resource rents
Partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance
Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance
Political budget cycles and election outcomes
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back
Exchange Rate Regime, Central Bank Independence, and Political Business Cycles in Brazil
Arms and Elections
Playing with Fire
Reconsidering the Relationship between CBI and FIX
Euro Area entry in east-central Europe
Coalition Government Formation and Foreign Exchange Markets
The Political Economy of Budget Deficits in the European Union
Fiscal Policy and the Democratic Process in the European Union
The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis
Electoral Cycles in Government Policy Making
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
European integration, voters and national politics
Policy by Contract
Electoral cycles in inequality
Fear of Floating and de Facto Exchange Rate Pegs with Multiple Key Currencies1
Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility
Political Cycles and Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization
The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt
The Politics of Central Bank Appointments
Electoral Incentives and Budgetary Spending
Elections and Markets
The Problem of Macroeconomic Policy Crossroads
The electoral costs of policy commitments
Modernizing Political Science
Electoral Budget Cycles in Legislatures
Biased politicians and independent agencies
Ties that Bind? Preferential Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice
International Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability
Not Complements, But Substitutes
Capital Preferences
Why is There No Race to the Bottom in Capital Taxation
Monetary Institutions and the Political Survival of Democratic Leaders
Where Should Multinationals Pay Taxes
Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment
Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital
Central Banks at War
Price Stability and Central Bank Independence
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
Political Parties and Monetary Commitments
Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes
The Reductionist Gamble
Coming to Terms
Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks
International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies
Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions
Government–Financial Market Relations after EMU
Adjusting to the EMU
Political Business Cycles in EU Accession Countries
Voting against Spending Cuts
Economic performance of ‘weak’ governments and their interaction with central banks and labour
From doves to hawks
Partisanship and the Path to Financial Openness
Escaping the Ties That Bind
Politically Connected Owners
Monetary Divergence
Political Accountability and the Room to Maneuver
Political Violence Cycles
Populism and De Facto Central Bank Independence
Electoral Andpartisancycles Ineconomicpolicies Andoutcomes
How Domestic Is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections
Thepoliticaleconomy Ofinternationalmonetaryrelations
Government Partisanship, Elections, and the Stock Market
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
The Side Effects of Central Bank Independence
Fear of Floating and the External Effects of Currency Unions
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy
Political Investment
Global Capital Cycles and Market Discipline
Engineering Good Times
Election-induced fiscal policy cycles in democratic and non-democratic emerging market and developing economies
Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention
Austerity and niche parties
Do political budget cycles work? A micro-level investigation of pre-electoral budgeting and its electoral consequences
Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance
Economic Politics
Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Has Globalization Gone Too Far?
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies
Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance
Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange Rates (Politiques finacierieures interieures avec un systeme de taux de change fixe et avec un systeme de taux de change fluctuant) (Politica financiera interna bajo sistemas de tipos de cambio fijos o de tipos de cambio fluctuantes)
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game
Political determinants of budget deficits
A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity
The Political Business Cycle
Small States in World Markets
The Retreat of the State
Partisan Politics in the Global Economy
Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change
Has Globalization Gone Too Far
Political Control of the Economy
Small States in World Markets
Capital taxation with open borders
The anti inflationary influence of corporatist structures and central bank independence
Political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the European Community
The Bundesbank's path to independence
The dynamics of financial globalization
Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics
A Political Model of the Business Cycle
Mixed Signals
Party government in 20 democracies
Capital Mobility and State Autonomy
An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism
Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy
Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money
Invested interests
Rulers of the game
Internationalization, institutions, and political change
Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments
International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies
Government ‘strength’ and budget deficits in advanced democracies
Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries
How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy
A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting
Elections and the Fed
On the Existence of a Political Monetary Cycle
In Defense of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations
Decision Making in Political Systems
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance
Abdication from National Policy Autonomy
The Abdication from National Policy Autonomy
| Unique citing works | 103 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,96 |
| Citation span | 2000 - 2025 (26) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 101 |