Democratic Accountability in Open Economies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12802498 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas Sattler (0000-0002-0655-2135, corresponding author), Patrick T Brandt (0000-0002-7261-7056), John R Freeman |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 71-91 |
| Publication date | 2010-04-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Quarterly Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1554-0626 • E-ISSN: 1554-0634 |
| Publisher | Now Publishers (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1561/100.00009031 |
| OpenAlex | W1970063666 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 41 |
We analyze democratic accountability in open economies based on different hypotheses about political evaluations and government responsiveness. Specifically, we assess whether citizens primarily rely on government policies or if they focus on economic outcomes resulting from these policies to evaluate governments. Our empirical analysis relies on Bayesian structural vector autoregression models for the British economy, aggregate monthly measures of public opinion, and economic evaluations from 1984 to 2006. We find that voters continuously monitor and strongly respond contemporaneously to changes in monetary and fiscal policies, but less to changes in macroeconomic outcomes. Voters also respond to policies differently when institutions change. When the Bank of England became politically independent, citizens shifted their attention toward fiscal policy, and the role of monetary policy in their evaluations decreased significantly. Finally, politicians respond to voting behavior by adjusting their policies in a sensible way. When vote intentions and approval decrease, the government reacts to the public by adjusting fiscal policy and, before the Bank of England became independent, also monetary policy
Accountability · Democracy · Economic policy · Economics · Fiscal policy · Government (linguistics · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Open economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Voting · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
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Engineering Good Times
Voter Responses to Fiscal Austerity
Do Markets Punish Left Governments
Progress in the Study of Nonstationary Political Time Series
Daring to fail
Fiscal consolidation under electoral risk
Does the @realDonaldTrump Really Matter to Financial Markets
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy
The Economic Vote
Political Choice in Britain
Inference in Linear Time Series Models with some Unit Roots
Bayes Factors
Macroeconomics and Reality
Government Popularity and the Next General Election
Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux
UK Real‐Time Macro Data Characteristics
Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy
Patterns of Representation
Modeling Macro-Political Dynamics
Advances in Bayesian Time Series Modeling and the Study of Politics
The American Public and the Room to Maneuver
Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
Political Accountability and the Room to Maneuver
A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
Vector Autoregression and the Study of Politics
Opinion–Policy Dynamics
Economic Evaluations, Prime Ministerial Approval and Governing Party Support
Wage Bargaining, Hard Money and Economic Performance
Major's lesser (not minor) effects
The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy
Dynamic Representation
Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2023 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |