The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3538422 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John T Williams (0000-0002-0647-6144, Indiana University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 767-795 |
| Publication date | 1990-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1962766 |
| OpenAlex | W2320450961 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 41 |
| References cited | 53 |
Conventional wisdom and some research indicate that macroeconomic policies follow cycles corresponding to political, as well as economic, forces. Using vector autoregression analysis, I test three models of monetary policy determination for the United States, 1953-1984: the electoral cycle model (that reelection motivations on the part of presidents create a policy cycle), the party differences model (that policy changes reflect revolving presidential party administrations), and the referendum model (that changes in presidential approval create, in effect, a continuing referendum, allowing presidents to monitor their success and change macroeconomic policies when necessary). Analysis shows that monetary policies, as measured by the monetary base and short-term interest rates, respond to the election cycle and presidential approval (although the effect on macroeconomic outcomes is ambiguous). Party differences are found in real income but are not very significant in other variables
Economics · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political science · Politics · Presidential election · Presidential system · Referendum · Test (biology · Vector autoregression · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
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Social Democracy Inside Out
Political monetary cycles
Transformation of Indonesia's Legislative Election System
Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994
From Niches to the Mainstream
Do voter preferences matter between elections? Democratic performance in Western Democracies
Democratic Accountability in Open Economies
Presidents and Defense Contracting, 1953-1992
Presidential Signaling in a Market Economy
Conditional Partisanship and Institutional Responsibility in Presidential Decision Making
Did the fed raise interest rates before elections
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus
Are there electoral cycles of emigration? An empirical investigation based on European data
Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending
Defense Contracting and Domnestic Politics
He's Stealing My Issues! Clinton's Crime Rhetoric and the Dynamics of Issue Ownership
Modeling Macro-Political Dynamics
Advances in Bayesian Time Series Modeling and the Study of Politics
Error Correction, Attitude Persistence, and Executive Rewards and Punishments
An Agenda For Econometric Model Building
The Decision to Attack Iraq
Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races
Another Look at “Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad
The impact of parties, economic growth, and public sector expansion
Voter ideology in western democracies, 1946–1989
Parties, media, the public and the economy
Government partisanship in Western democracies, 1945–1998
Political Accountability and the Room to Maneuver
The Political Economy of Corporate Taxation
Electoral Cycles in Federal Government Prime Contract Awards
The Political (And Economic) Origins of Consumer Confidence
Long-Memoried Processes, Unit Roots, and Causal Inference in Political Science
A Computable Equilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economy
Taking Time Seriously
Housing Starts and the Political Business Cycle
Appointing the Fed Chair
Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion
Bayesian Inference for Comparative Research
Can Political Science History be Neutral
What Moves Policy Sentiment
Monetary Politics
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Econometric policy evaluation
Macroeconomics and Reality
The Political Business Cycle
Studies in business-cycle theory
Social Choice and Individual Values
Public Interest, Private Interest, and the Democratic Polity
Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984
The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies
The American Political Economy
Basic Issues in Econometrics
An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States
The Political Economy of New Deal Spending
An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States
Political Control of the Economy
Interpreting Economic Time Series
A Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom
Welfare Consequences of the Six-Year Presidential Term Evaluated in the Context of a Model of the U.S. Economy
Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964
Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection
Domestic Political Sources of American Monetary Policy
Partisan Manipulation of the Economy
Public Support for American Presidents
The Price of Popularity
Presidential Influence on the Federal Reserve in the 1970s
Elections and the Fed
Granger Causality and the Times Series Analysis of Political Relationships
On the Existence of a Political Monetary Cycle
Vector Autoregression and the Study of Politics
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy
Candidate Motivation
Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson
Policy Motivation and Party Differences in a Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition
Promise and Performance
| Unique citing works | 41 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,14 |
| Citation span | 1990 - 2025 (36) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 40 |