Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3403441 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alberto Alesina (Harvard University Press), Howard Rosenthal, Howard L Rosenthal (0000-0001-5051-1341, Carnegie Mellon University) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 373-398 |
| Publication date | 1989-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1962396 |
| OpenAlex | W1967000664 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 103 |
| References cited | 49 |
In the postwar United States the president's party has always done worse in the midterm congressional elections than in the previous congressional election. Republican administrations exhibit below-average, and Democratic administrations above-average, economic growth in the first half of each term, whereas in the latter halves the two see equal growth. Our rational expectations model is consistent with these two regularities. In presidential elections, voters choose between two polarized candidates. They then use midterm elections to counterbalance the president's policies by strengthening the opposition in Congress. Since presidents of different parties are associated with different policies, our model predicts a (spurious) correlation between the state of the economy and elections. Our predictions contrast with those of retrospective voting models, in which voters reward the incumbent if the economy is doing well before the election. Our model performs empirically at least as well as, and often better than, alternative models
Democracy · Economics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Spurious relationship · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact · Public Administration
The 2002 Midterm Election
Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote
Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities
A Theory of Divided Government
Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in Oecd Democracies
Electoral business cycle in industrial democracies
Congress, Presidential Approval, and U.S. Dispute Initiation
An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap
Sobering up after “Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting?”
Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994
Congressional Opposition, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation, 1946-2000
Economic Performance, Voting, and Political Support
Midterm Elections and Economic Fluctuations
The Midterm Landslide of 2010
Factors Influencing Voting Decision
A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts
A Comparison of National Effects on Individual U.S. Senate Elections
The Majority-Party Disadvantage
The Price of Legislative Success
Le troisième tour? The effects of the change to concurrent presidential and legislative elections on party campaigning and perception in France
State Formation and the Decline of Political Parties
Conditional Partisanship and Institutional Responsibility in Presidential Decision Making
Endogenizing Labor Mobility
When Killers Become Victims
The End of Midterm Decline
Partisan views on the economy
Vote splitting as insurance against uncertainty
Divided we vote
Evolutionary voter sophistication and political business cycles
Partisan Political Business Cycles in the German Labour Market? Empirical Tests in the Light of the Lucas-Critique
US presidential elections and real GDP growth, 1961–2004
Strategic poll responses when elections create mandates
Economic Performance and Political Outcomes
An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts
The Politics of Investment By the Nationalized Sector
Accountability and U.S. Senate Elections
Party does not matter
How bad is it? Variation in perceptions of regional economic conditions
Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House
The Bocconi boys go to Brussels
Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle
Aggregate Vote Functions for the U.S. Presidency, Senate, and House
Quality, Not Quantity
Sources of Split-ticket Voting in the 1988 American Elections
Explaining Seat Changes in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1950–98
Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government
Multimember District Congressional Elections
Decomposing the Sources of Incumbency Advantage in the U. S. House
Electoral balancing, divided government and ‘midterm’ loss in German elections
The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force
Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy
Economic Voting and the Welfare State
A Gubernatorial Helping Hand? How Governors Affect Presidential Elections
Divided Government and Economic Voting
The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate
The Accuracy of Game Theory Predictions for Political Behavior
The Importance of Being Republican
The Rationality of Economic Voting Revisited
The Choosers or the Choices? Voter Characteristics and the Structure of Electoral Competition as Explanations for Ticket Splitting
Presidents and the Prospective Voter
Paradigm, School, or Sect? Some Reflections on the Status of Rational Choice Theory in Contemporary Scandinavian Political Science
Choices that matter
Candidates, Money, and Voters-Assessing the State of Congressional Elections Research
The End of the Democratic Era? 1994 and the Future of Congressional Election Research
Presidential Elections and the Econonmy 1872 to 1996
Complex Measures and Sociotropic Voting
Dual accountability and the nationalization of party competition
The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory
Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences
A Utility Function Analysis of Competing Models of Party Support
Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921?2001
Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization
Party Identification, Retrospective Voting, and Moderating Elections in a Federal System
Macroeconomic Conditions, Voter Turnout, and the Working-class/Economically Disadvantaged Party Vote in Developing Countries
Fonctions de vote et prévisions électorales, une application à la présidentielle française de 2007
Economic Growth Strategies
Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election
Presidential and Congressional Vote‐Share Equations
The Corrective Effect of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity
The Rationality of Economic Voting and the Macroeconomic Regime
Gubernatorial Midterm Slumps
The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing World
Do British Party Politics Exhibit Cycles
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
Coattails, Raincoats, and Congressional Election Outcomes
Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections
The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government
Social and economic determinants of Turkish voter choice in the 1995 parliamentary election
Government competence, economic performance and endogenous election dates
Strategic politicians, partisan roll calls, and the Tea Party
The use of the encompassing principle to resolve empirical controversies in voting behavior
Loss aversion, presidential responsibility, and midterm congressional elections
Cycles in American National Electoral Politics, 1854-2006
The Electoral Origins of Polarized Politics
Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence
The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy
Economic and Referendum Voting
Coordination and Policy Moderation at Midterm
Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting
Divided Government in the American States
Candidates with policy preferences
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
The Ecological Fallacy
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
The Political Business Cycle
Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984
Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980
The American Political Economy
The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President
The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President
Presidential Popularity and Macroeconomic Performance
U.S. Presidential Elections 1968-80
Voting behavior and aggregate policy targets
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule
Rules Rather than Discretion
Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues
Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions
Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964
The Puzzle of Midterm Loss
Domestic Political Sources of American Monetary Policy
The Polarization of American Politics
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model
A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis
Economic Discontent and Political Behavior
The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote
Strategy and Choice in the 1982 Congressional Elections
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
The Ecological Fallacy Revisited
Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment
Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections
Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections
Candidate Motivation
| Unique citing works | 103 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,78 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 2024 (36) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 101 |