An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3363307 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James L Perry (0000-0003-0137-7208, University of California, Irvine), Charles H Levine (Syracuse University) |
| Year | 1976 |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1185-1201 |
| Publication date | 1976-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1959384 |
| OpenAlex | W2318764560 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 41 |
Despite increased interest in public sector collective bargaining, a survey of recent attempts to build theory about the dynamics and outcomes of union-management negotiations in public organizations reveals that little progress has been made. One approach that appears fruitful is interorganizational analysis. In an interorganizational context, organizations interact with other autonomous organizations to make joint decisions that have implications for both parties and for the larger system. This study focuses on five interorganizational variables that are useful for understanding the collective bargaining process in the public sector: (1) goal divergence; (2) stability of the relationship; (3) organizational dependence; (4) conflictual behavior; (5) contractual change.From these theoretical concepts, five propositions are derived which serve as the basis for the research hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 60 cases drawn from a population of 535 collective bargaining negotiations in New York City from 1968 through 1972. The test of the research hypotheses resulted in these conclusions: (1) a substantial amount of the conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining is explained by goal divergence, stability of the relationship, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations; and (2) contractual change is explained by goal divergence, conflictual behavior, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations
Bargaining power · Business · Collective bargaining · Context (archaeology · Divergence (linguistics · Economics · Economy · Market economy · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Population · Public sector · Social science · Sociology · Cooperative Studies and Economics · Labor Movements and Unions · Public Policy and Administration Research
Industrial relations systems.
Approaches to organizational design
A behavioral theory of labor negotiations
The Functions of Social Conflict
Power and Discontent
The Logic of Collective Action
The Sociology of Social Conflicts
Governing New York City
Communication, the Development of Trust, and Cooperative Behavior
Cognitive conflict between persons
The sociology of social conflicts
Collaboration among six persons in a Prisoner's Dilemma game
Stability and sudden change in interpersonal and international affairs
Aggressive behaviors within polities, 1948-1962
Motives, situation, and interpersonal conflict within Prisoner's Dilemma
An approach to the study of communicative acts
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service
The Local Union-Management Relationship
Interpersonal and Inter-party Exchange
Core and the Strategy of Non-violence
The effect of threat upon interpersonal bargaining
An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories
Who 'Wins' in Wage Bargaining
A Theory of Conflict and Power in Union-Management Relations
A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City Governments
The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States
Frontiers of Collective Bargaining
Human Behavior
Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,12 |
| Citation span | 1976 - 2015 (40) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |