The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3376567 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William H Riker (Lawrence University), Donald Niemi (University of Chicago) |
| Year | 1962 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 58-65 |
| Publication date | 1962-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1953096 |
| OpenAlex | W2104759035 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 39 |
| References cited | 7 |
In some recent discussions of roll calls in Congress a model of interacting blocs has often been adopted and to a considerable degree verified. This model assumes the existence of several fairly cohesive blocs along with, perhaps, some unattached members. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of these blocs are fairly consistently opposed on roll calls, while others ally now with one side, now with the other. This model is attractive, not only because it accords with the usage of journalists, but also because it seems to provide a rational explanation of what sometimes appears to be the almost random confusion of Congressional voting behavior. As the evidence here presented suggests, however, this model is somewhat too neat and requires modification to account for shifting alliances over (often relatively short periods of) time. In a trial, reasoning from the assumptions of this model, we attempted to pick out those blocs and members who shifted from side to side. We were, however, unable to do so except in a few instances, largely, we believe, because the model as heretofore developed is static
Confusion · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Stability (learning theory · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Law · Psychology
Partisan Models and the Search for Party Effects in the US Senate
Interest Group Theory
The Party Faithful
How Parties Nominate Presidents
The Comparative Advantage of State Interest Organization Research
Theories of Parties
The Road Less Taken
Party Coalitions in the US Congress
Social and Economic Justice Movements and Organizations
Who Sings in the Heavenly Chorus?
Party Nominating Procedures and Recruitment—State and Local Level
Activists, Influence, and Representation in American Elections
Methodological Issues in the Study of Political Parties
Political Parties and Consultants
State Parties Research
The Mobilization and Influence of Business Interests
What a Difference Twenty-Five Years Makes
Interest Groups and Agendas
Interest Groups in American Elections
The State of Research on Political Parties and Interest Groups
The Evolution of National Party Organizations
Lobbying and Influence
Urban Interest Groups
The Evolution and Alteration of American Party Coalitions
The Pure Partisan Institution
Linking Political Parties and Interest Groups
The President, Party Politics, and Constitutional Development
Winning Isn't Everything
Methodological Perspectives on Interest Groups
American Political Parties
Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
The Oxford handbook of American political parties and interest groups
Democratic decay by design
Policymaking in a plural society
Voter's paradox and logrolling
Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties
Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court
The Politics of Bicameral Agreement
Spatial Effects on Voting Power in Representative Democracies
| Unique citing works | 39 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.78 |
| Citation span | 1976 - 2026 (51) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 39 |