Against Quasi-Fideism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3520234 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Annalisa Coliva (0000-0001-6258-5276, University of California, Irvine, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 365 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-13 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religions (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2077-1444 • E-ISSN: 2077-1444 |
| Publisher | MDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.3390/rel16030365 |
| OpenAlex | W4408405171 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 20 |
In a series of papers, Duncan Pritchard has argued that Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty (OC) provide the foundation for a quasi-fideistic account of religious belief. This account seeks to navigate a middle path between evidentialism-the view that religious belief is rational only if supported by epistemic reasons-and fideism, which holds that religious belief cannot be rationally justified precisely because it is not grounded in epistemic reasons. Central to Pritchard's quasi-fideism is a parity argument, which asserts that religious and non-religious beliefs are on equal footing. For the rationality of both depends on their connection to a background of a-rational foundational commitments, or "hinges". In this paper, I challenge Pritchard's account on two fronts. First, I argue that his quasi-fideism relies on a contentious interpretation of OC, and of Wittgenstein's views about religious discourse, making it questionable whether it can genuinely be considered an application of Wittgenstein's views to religious epistemology. Second, I contend that quasi-fideism, as developed by Pritchard, is inherently unstable, as it risks either collapsing into fideism or permitting relativism, contrary to Pritchard's intentions. I then explore the potential for quasi-fideism-or, at any rate, a position meant to steer a middle path between evidentialism and fideism-under an alternative interpretation of OC. While this alternative framework may offer better prospects than Pritchard's original formulation for avoiding the pitfalls of fideism and relativism, while sidestepping evidentialism, I argue that it ultimately fails to support a parity argument between religious and non-religious beliefs. Consequently, it cannot sustain a religious epistemology that avoids both evidentialism and fideism
Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Religious hinge epistemology
Religious Belief as Hinge Proposition
The 'Local' Nature of Religious Hinges and the Problem of 'Honest Doubt
Religious Belief in the Later Wittgenstein-A 'Form of Life', a 'Hinge', a 'Weltanschauung', Something Else or None of These
Wittgenstein on the Grammar of Unshakeable Religious Beliefs
Wittgenstein, Religion and Deep Epistemic Injustice
How to Measure the Firmness of a Belief
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 7 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |