A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions

Bibliographic Data

ID3568633
AuthorsChristian List (0000-0003-1627-800X, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume98
Issue3
Pages495-513
Publication date2004-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0003055404001303
OpenAlexW2158010798
LanguageEN
Citations received30
References cited34

I model sequential decisions over multiple interconnected propositions and investigate path-dependence in such decisions. The propositions and their interconnections are represented in propositional logic. A sequential decision process is path-dependent if its outcome depends on the order in which the propositions are considered. Assuming that earlier decisions constrain later ones, I prove three main results: First, certain rationality violations by the decision-making agent-individual or group-are necessary and sufficient for path-dependence. Second, under some conditions, path-dependence is unavoidable in decisions made by groups. Third, path-dependence makes decisions vulnerable to strategic agenda setting and strategic voting. I also discuss escape routes from path-dependence. My results are relevant to discussions on collective consistency and reason-based decision-making, focusing not only on outcomes, but also on underlying reasons, beliefs, and constraints

Consistency (knowledge bases · Economics · Group Decision Making · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Path (computing · Path dependence · Political science · Process (computing · Rationality · Voting · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Psychology · Social Psychology

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