"Killer" Amendments in Congress
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3579519 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John D Wilkerson, John Wilkerson (University of Washington, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 93 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 535-552 |
| Publication date | 1999-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2585573 |
| OpenAlex | W2153715756 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 25 |
| References cited | 26 |
For more than three decades, social choice theorists and legislative scholars have studied how legislative outcomes in Congress can be manipulated through strategic amendments and voting. I address the central limitation of this research, a virtual absence of systematic empirical work, by examining 76 "killer" amendments considered during the 103d and 104th congresses. I trace the effects of these amendments on their related bills using archival sources, test for strategic voting using NOMINATE as the baseline measure of legislator preferences across a range of issues, and explore with OLS regression why some killer amendments are more strategically important than others. The findings indicate that successful killer amendments and identifiable strategic voting are extremely rare. In none of the cases examined could the defeat of a bill be attributed to adoption of an alleged killer amendment
Biology · Economics · Legislation · Legislator · Legislature · NOMINATE · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Test (biology · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
MCMCpack
Delegation, Agenda Control, and Budget Reform in Brazil, 1999–2008
Legislative Process in International Organizations
The agenda power of non-legislative tools
A Danish killer amendment—when judicial review was banned from the 1849 Constitution
Toward a theory of minority-party influence in the U.S. Congress
The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment
Insincere voting under the successive procedure
In Search of Killer Amendments In the Modern U.S. House
Legislative Structure
The Powell Amendment Voting Cycle
Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting in Congress
Investigating the Incidence of Killer Amendments in Congress
Dimensions, Issues, and Bills
Setting the Legislative Agenda
Integrating Voting Theory and Roll Call Analysis
Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting
Bicameralism and Minority‐Party Influence on Legislative Development
Strategic Behaviour in Parliament
Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress
Keeping Your Friends Close and Your Enemies Closer? Information Networks in Legislative Politics
Assessing the effect of activists and their legislative allies in the amendment of bills in Chile
Parties and Procedural Choice in the House Rules Committee
Setting the Table
Legislative Gridlock and Policymaking Through the Appropriations Process
The theory of political coalitions.
Congressmen's Voting Decisions
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Vote trading in a legislative context
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Amendment in Legislative Strategy
The Closed Rule and the Paradox of Voting
Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate
Sophisticated Voting in Supermajoritarian Settings
Sophisticated Voting in Congress
Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting
Reelection and Representation in Conflict
Identifying Voting Strategies from Roll Call Votes
The Analysis of Committee Power
Explaining the Vote
Sophisticated Sincerity
Farquharson and Fenno
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Dimensions in Congressional Voting
| Unique citing works | 25 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,93 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2023 (25) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 25 |