Legislatures, Bureaucracies, and Distributive Spending
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3596964 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael M Ting (0000-0002-1144-346X, Columbia University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 106 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 367-385 |
| Publication date | 2012-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055412000081 |
| OpenAlex | W2144816475 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 54 |
This article develops a theory of bureaucratic influence on distributive politics. Although there exists a rich literature on the effects of institutions such as presidents, electoral systems, and bicameralism on government spending, the role of professional bureaucrats has yet to receive formal scrutiny. In the model, legislators bargain over the allocation of distributive benefits across districts. The legislature may either "politicize" a program by bargaining directly over pork and bypassing bureaucratic scrutiny, or "professionalize" it by letting a bureaucrat approve or reject project funding in each district according to an underlying quality standard. The model predicts that the legislature will professionalize when the expected program quality is high. However, politicization becomes more likely as the number of high-quality projects increases and under divided government. Further, more competent bureaucrats can encourage politicization if the expected program quality is low. Finally, politicized programs are larger than professionalized programs
Bureaucracy · Distributive property · Economics · Government (linguistics · Government spending · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Quality (philosophy · Scrutiny · Welfare · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
Inhibitory Institutions
Distributive Politics
Agency Design and Distributive Politics
Political Corruption Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies
Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration
Political Economy Determinants of Public Spending Allocations
Elected or appointed? How the nomination scheme of the city manager influences the effects of government fragmentation
Quota Shocks
Loyalty or Incentives? How Party Alignment Affects Bureaucratic Performance
On the separation of executive and legislative powers
Agency policy preferences, congressional letter-marking and the allocation of distributive policy benefits
Bureaucratic locus of control
Partisan Procurement
Taking the Law to Court
Politicizing Agency Spending Authority
Pork barrel politics
National Innovation Systems
The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
Pillars of Prosperity
Deliberate Discretion?
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I
Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion
The Politician and the Judge
Essays in Economic Sociology
Agency Design and Distributive Politics
Perpetuating the Pork Barrel
Muddy Waters
Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries
Superfund Expenditures and Cleanup Priorities
Bureaucratic Reactions to Political Pressures
Building majority coalitions for sub-majority benefit distributions
A Scientific Standard and an Agency’s Legal Independence
The Investigators
Police
The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency
The Political Economy of Pork
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory
The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era
Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory of Distributive Public Policy
The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information
Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control
Slackers and Zealots
Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork
Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas
Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing
Federal Grant Agencies and Congressional Election Campaigns
Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays
Balancing Regionalism and Localism
Congress and America's Political Development
Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel
A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs
Politicizing Agency Spending Authority
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
Equal Votes, Equal Money
Presidential Pork
Bargaining in Legislatures
Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures
Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods
Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,94 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |