The Rise and Decline of an Open Collaboration System
How Wikipedia’s Reaction to Popularity Is Causing Its Decline
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3756446 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron Halfaker (0000-0001-8907-6367, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA), R Stuart Geiger (0000-0001-7215-0532, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA), Jonathan T Morgan (University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA), John Riedl (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 664-688 |
| Publication date | 2013-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Behavioral Scientist (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0002-7642 • E-ISSN: 1552-3381 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0002764212469365 |
| OpenAlex | W2036291768 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 35 |
| References cited | 31 |
Open collaboration systems, such as Wikipedia, need to maintain a pool of volunteer contributors to remain relevant. Wikipedia was created through a tremendous number of contributions by millions of contributors. However, recent research has shown that the number of active contributors in Wikipedia has been declining steadily for years and suggests that a sharp decline in the retention of newcomers is the cause. This article presents data that show how several changes the Wikipedia community made to manage quality and consistency in the face of a massive growth in participation have ironically crippled the very growth they were designed to manage. Specifically, the restrictiveness of the encyclopedia's primary quality control mechanism and the algorithmic tools used to reject contributions are implicated as key causes of decreased newcomer retention. Furthermore, the community's formal mechanisms for norm articulation are shown to have calcified against changes-especially changes proposed by newer editors
Consistency (knowledge bases) · Encyclopedia · Internet privacy · Norm (philosophy) · Political science · Public relations · Quality (philosophy) · Restrictiveness · Computer Science · Digital Rights Management and Security · Law · Open Source Software Innovations · Wikis in Education and Collaboration
Wikimedia research methodologies
Are Digital Knowledge Commons Real Commons?
Value Sensitive Design for Peer Production Systems
Communication networks do not predict success in attempts at peer production
Social Media and Democracy
Misinformation, Disinformation, and Online Propaganda
Social Media, Echo Chambers, and Political Polarization
Governable Spaces
Unpacking determinants of knowledge quality in an online knowledge community
Can bots help create knowledge? The effects of bot intervention in open collaboration
From oligarchy to decentralization
A Systems Approach to Studying Online Communities
The block log
What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the vocabulary of complaint
Admins, mods, and benevolent dictators for life
Common sense or censorship
Beyond notification
Decoding revision mechanisms in Wikipedia
Mundane work for utopian ends
Anyone can edit’, not everyone does
Wikipedia in the anti-Sopa protests as a case study of direct, deliberative democracy in cyberspace
Mind the skills gap
Hacking Weber
Wikipedia
Large-Scale Communication is More Complex and Unpredictable with Automated Bots
Where and when AI and CI meet
Laboratories of Oligarchy? How the Iron Law Extends to Peer Production
Overcoming Social Barriers When Contributing to Open Source Software Projects
Latent Groups in Online Communities
Why and how medical schools, peer-reviewed journals, and research funders should promote Wikipedia editing
Wp
Beyond opening up the black box
Domination et critique dans les projets collaboratifs sur internet
The Free Encyclopaedia that Anyone can Edit
Automated Platform Governance Through Visibility and Scale
| Unique citing works | 35 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,69 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 32 |