The Boundaries of Public Reason

Bibliographic Data

ID3765032
AuthorsFred M Frohock (Syracuse University, corresponding author)
Year1997
Volume91
Issue4
Pages833-844
Publication date1997-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2952167
OpenAlexW2332559505
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited19

Modern versions of public reason occasionally must address disputes so profound and divisive that the adjudicative powers of reason cannot resolve them on the expectations of liberal governance. The beliefs underlying these disputes represent the legitimate pluralism of the liberal state, but they also reproducewithinthe languages of public reason the same divisive views that the liberal state must manage in the larger society. The effects of divisive beliefs can be mitigated, however, with a noncomputational version of public reason that allows collective terms to dominate simple merit adjudication. This type of reasoning requires a survey of considerations beyond the merits of the case at hand and opens public reason to the more general needs of the political society

Adjudication · Classical liberalism · Corporate governance · Democracy · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Liberalism · Pluralism (philosophy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Public reason · Simple (philosophy · Sociology · State (computer science · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Public Administration

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