Bodily Feeling in Emotion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3889564 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip J Koch, PHILIP KOCH (0000-0002-1094-318X, University of Prince Edward Island, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 59-76 |
| Publication date | 1987-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s001221730004230x |
| OpenAlex | W2026516302 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 16 |
One might imagine that this remark of James was too obvious to be denied, but in fact current philosophical orthodoxy runs against it. Since the renewal of interest in the emotions produced by Anthony Kenny's Action Emotion and Will in 1963, philosophers have focussed primarily on the cognitive aspects of emotions-the judgments, evaluations, beliefs, presuppositions which they contain. Bodily feelings have been, on the whole, slighted. Sometimes they are dismissed outright, as by Robert Solomon: "feelings no more constitute or define the emotion than an army of fleas constitutes a homeless dog. ... Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, not its essence."; more often, as in Jerome Neu, given only rather slight attention because "thoughts are of greater importance than feelings (in the narrow sense of felt sensations) in the classification and discrimination of emotional states
Action (physics) · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Feeling · Orthodoxy · Presupposition · Psychoanalysis · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 2011 (23) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |