Debt Relief and Civil War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3915929 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tony Addison (0000-0003-3324-9059, World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), United Nations University), Mansoob Murshed (0000-0003-3717-6424), Syed Mansoob Murshed (0000-0002-8360-033X, Instituto de Estudios Sociales) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 159-176 |
| Publication date | 2003-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343303040002002 |
| OpenAlex | W2097582949 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 18 |
Reducing or writing off the debts of the 41 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) can potentially reduce social conflict by releasing resources from debt-service to enable governments to make fiscal transfers that lower the grievances of rebels (when conflict is partly rooted in grievances over past allocations of public spending and taxation). To explore these issues, this article presents a model of a civil war between a government and rebels, with both sides maximizing their expected utility from the states of war and peace. The government may accept debt relief but then renege on any promise to donors to use the resources to buy peace and instead keep the resources for itself and raise its military capability. The outcome that prevails depends on which party (peace or war) has the greatest influence on the government of the day. Unfortunately, even if debt relief is forthcoming, the fiscal system may be so institutionally weak that it cannot achieve the promised transfer. Also, the rebel leaders may capture most of the fiscal transfer, leaving the grievances of their followers to ferment into further conflict. And a transfer that could have prevented conflict may be insufficient to stop a war once it begins. The international community has only limited influence over these problems. But the international community can change the modality of debt relief itself so that peace-seeking governments can receive faster debt relief, thereby at least ensuring that peace is not delayed by the inevitable difficulties that wartime governments face in meeting donor policy conditionality
Business · Conditionality · Debt · Development economics · Economic policy · Economics · External debt · Financial system · Government (linguistics) · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public finance · Redress · Spanish Civil War · Agricultural risk and resilience · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Finance · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
ABC's, 123's, and the Golden Rule
External arms embargoes and their implications for government expenditure, democracy and internal conflict
External Debt in Post-Conflict Countries
Is Inequality in Africa Really Different
Social Constraints and Civil War
Aid to conflict-affected countries
Human Capital Accumulation in Pakistan in the Light of Debt, Military Expenditure and Politics
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development
War, Hunger, and Displacement
The Logic of Collective Action
How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted? Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief
Military expenditure, spin-off and economic development
Civil War and the Social Contract
Anarchy and its Breakdown
Debt Relief
The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa
Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,35 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2023 (21) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |