The rise of rebel contenders
Barriers to entry and fragmentation in civil wars
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3916024 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hanne Fjelde (0000-0001-5251-7309, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University & Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)), David Nilsson (0000-0003-0205-2843, Uppsala University, corresponding author), Desiree Nilsson |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 551-565 |
| Publication date | 2018-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343318767497 |
| OpenAlex | W2807242756 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 37 |
| References cited | 52 |
Fragmentation of armed opposition movements through the rise of new rebel groups constitutes a significant challenge to conflict termination and peacebuilding. Yet, the question of why some rebel movements remain cohesive whereas others see a number of contending groups during the course of the armed conflict has received limited attention in existing research. This article addresses this gap by analyzing the determinants of the rise of rebel contenders in intrastate armed conflicts worldwide, 1975-2013. The theoretical framework focuses on barriers to entry, that is, variations in the costs and disadvantages that must be borne by nascent rebel contenders that are not borne to the same extent by incumbent rebel groups. The study proposes that strong social networks underpinning incumbent groups create structural barriers to entry for nascent groups by aggravating challenges of organization building. It further suggests that the interaction between incumbent groups and the government influences strategic barriers to entry as changes in government policies produce windows of opportunity for nascent groups to form. Consistent with these arguments, the study finds that when incumbent groups have strong networks - because rebels either tap into ethnic networks or draw on a leftist ideology - the risk of fragmentation is lower. Furthermore, when the government accommodates groups, through either negotiations or democratic concessions, the risk of fragmentation increases
Democracy · Fragmentation (computing) · Ideology · Negotiation · Opportunity structures · Opposition (politics) · Peacebuilding · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Underpinning · Computer Science · Engineering · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
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A Motion of No Confidence
Power-Sharing
The Impact of Commercial Military Actors on Armed Conflict Termination, 1990–2010
Strategic Territorial Power-Sharing and Multi-Party Bargaining in Civil Wars
Economic shocks and militant formation
The emergence of splinter factions in intrastate conflict
Causal Pathways of Rebel Defection from Negotiated Settlements
A Relational Theory of Jihadist Affiliate Behaviour
Civil Conflict Fragmentation and the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations
Signaling Resolve through Credit-claiming
Explaining the number of rebel groups in civil wars
Not All Stationary Bandits are the Same
Strategic rebels
Rebel command and control, time, and rebel group splits
Armed group proliferation and conflict dynamics
Parents of the revolution rebel leaders’ intergenerational social capital and insurgency cohesion
Rebel Group Substitutes and Peace Agreement Amnesties
Militant Splinter Groups and the Use of Violence
Does Withdrawal of Troops After Military Intervention Reduce Rebel Groups
Biafra Since 1999
The consequences of trust and repression on the rise and fall of movements in authoritarian regimes
Armed Group Consolidation
Fueling Factionalism? The Impact of Peace Processes on Rebel Group Fragmentation in Civil Wars
Pathways to Cooperation
Conflict-related Sexual Violence and Rebel Group Fragmentation
Recruiting Rebels
Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts
Tolerant Solidarity With Violent Protesters
The Intractability of Islamist Insurgencies
Rebel Fragmentation and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers
Costly Concessions, Internally Divided Movements, and Strategic Repression
One for All? State Violence and Insurgent Cohesion
Winning Hearts and Minds for Rebel Rulers
On-Side fighting in civil war
How critical junctures shape secessionist movement cohesion
The Terrorist's Dilemma
Alliance Formation in Civil Wars
Barriers to New Competition
Clarify
Elusive peace
The Management of Peace Processes
Networks of Rebellion
Power in Numbers
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
Perceptions regarding strategic and structural entry barriers
Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict1
The Good of Wrath
Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War
Turning Weakness into Strength
Spoiling Inside and Out
Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War
A Plague of Initials
Rebels against Rebels
Disputes over the Divine
It Takes Two
Weakening the Enemy
Recruitment and Allegiance
Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East
Fighting with Faith
Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources
Desertion and Collective Action in Civil Wars
From Armed Conflict to War
The election trap
How Does Ethnic Rebellion Start
Veto Players and Civil War Duration
Intraethnic Dominance and Control
Out-Group Conflict, In-Group Unity
Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement
Partial Peace
Rebellion, mediation, and group change
Battlefield Outcomes and Rebel Cohesion
Organized violence, 1989-2015
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007
Armed conflicts, 1946-2013
E pluribus unum, ex uno plures
Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede
International System and Technologies of Rebellion
Organizing Rebellion
Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision
Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time
Peacemaking in Civil War
Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements
Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity
Networks of Faith
Resource Mobilization and Social Movements
| Unique citing works | 37 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,63 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 36 |