Cheap talk or costly commitment? Leader statements and the implementation of civil war peace agreements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3916293 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alyssa K Prorok (0000-0002-1606-9737, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, corresponding author), Deniz Cil (0000-0002-8220-1433, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 409-424 |
| Publication date | 2022-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00223433211037130 |
| OpenAlex | W3212117027 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 44 |
This article examines how leaders affect the implementation of peace agreements. It argues that implementation is more likely when leaders have publicly committed to peace because public commitments tie leaders' hands, making it costly to back down from peaceful promises. This effect is hypothesized to hold even under conditions that make implementation costly: when implementing difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These expectations are tested using novel data from the IPAD dataset on the implementation of peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 and on public statements by state and rebel leaders. Results show that governments and rebel groups whose leaders have publicly committed to peace are significantly more likely to make progress toward implementation. This effect holds for difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These findings highlight the importance of leaders' political will for successful implementation of peace agreements and sustainable peace
Affect (linguistics) · Computer security · Political science · Politics · Public relations · State (computer science) · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |