Supplying peace
Participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3917432 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Vincenzo Bove (0000-0001-7398-9049, University of Essex, corresponding author), Leandro Elia (0000-0001-7687-284X, University of Calabria) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 699-714 |
| Publication date | 2011-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343311418265 |
| OpenAlex | W2096181286 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 90 |
| References cited | 30 |
We explore the supply side of peacekeeping - the determinants of a country's voluntary contributions to peacekeeping operations. We focus on troop contribution and examine a large set of operations, from UN-led missions to operations led by NATO, the African Union, the European Union, and ad hoc coalitions. We rely on a theoretical model of the private provision of public goods and a dataset on troop contribution across 102 states and 45 operations from 1999 to 2009 to explain both the conditions under which third-party actors are more or less likely to intervene in peacekeeping operations and the factors determining the size of their personnel contribution. We use the characteristics of the conflict to identify which types of conflicts attract outside intervention and the characteristics of the intervener to identify the countries more willing to provide troops. We show that at the domestic level, contributions are driven by the comparative advantage in manpower - or the relative value of labor - and constrained by the tolerance of casualties and the sustainability of multiple and concurrent missions. At the international level, the most robust explanations of when states choose to intervene are the level of threat to global and regional stability, the proximity to the conflict area, and the number of displaced people. In particular, security and humanitarian concerns trigger nation-specific responses. Our empirical findings provide further evidence of the centrality of country-specific gains in explaining the participation in peacekeeping. However, contributor-specific benefits play the same role in UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions, in contrast with previous empirical studies on the financial burden-sharing
Business · European union · International trade · Intervention (counseling) · Peacekeeping · Political science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Development and Aid · Peacebuilding and International Security · Psychology · Public Administration
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Breaking the Balance? The Impact of Peacekeeping Deployments on Civil–Military Relations
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Just Different Hats? Comparing UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping
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Token Forces
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Examining UN PKO contributions at multiple levels
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Accidental rivals? EU fiscal rules, Nato, and transatlantic burden-sharing
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Personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions
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Who commits the most to Nato? It depends on how we measure commitment
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Politics of African Peace Support Operation Architecture
The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods
The Value of a Statistical Life
The weak instrument problem of the system GMM estimator in dynamic panel data models
On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data
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Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Peace Operations
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Uniting for Peace
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The International Military Intervention Dataset
| Unique citing works | 90 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,43 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 88 |