Refugee flows and state contributions to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3916384 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gary Uzonyi (0000-0001-6006-993X, University of Massachusetts Lowell, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 743-757 |
| Publication date | 2015-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343315574353 |
| OpenAlex | W2225424081 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 38 |
| References cited | 50 |
Why do states participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions? Extant theory revolves around two benefits states derive from participation: the financial benefits participants receive for their contributions and the ability to further liberal norms abroad. Yet, these theories have received limited empirical support. In addition, they cannot explain where and when leaders send troops. To rectify these limitations, I focus on a more straightforward benefit states receive from limiting conflict and providing stability to war-torn regions. Namely, stabilizing conflict areas helps stem the externalities caused from ongoing conflicts, such as refugees. This explanation of participation in peacekeeping predicts who is most likely to send support (those fearing refugee inflows), the size of contribution (increasing relative to the inflows), and where they send assistance (to the specific conflict area producing the externalities). Statistical analysis of all UN peacekeeping missions since 1990 provides support for this argument and reveals that refugee flows better predict who is likely to contribute troops, and to what conflict, than the size of those contributions. While other realpolitik considerations strongly influence which states participate in UN peacekeeping, neither democracy nor state need is a statistically significant explanator of who contributes. However, state need does predict the size of contribution
Argument (complex analysis) · Conflict resolution · Democracy · Development economics · Economics · Externality · Peacekeeping · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Realpolitik · Refugee · State (computer science) · International Development and Aid · Law · Medicine · Migration, Refugees, and Integration · Peacebuilding and International Security
Hosting Your Enemy
The Political Economy of Peacekeeping
Populism’s Challenge to International Institutions
Help is close at hand? Proximity and the effectiveness of peacekeepers
Beyond Dues
Supplying UN Peacekeepers
The known knowns and known unknowns of peacekeeping data
The European Union’s Role in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
An Institutional Explanation of Troop Contributions in UN Peacekeeping Missions
The United Nations After 75
Who Can Go First? Evidence From UN PKOs in Africa in 1990-2016
Non-Democratic Regimes and Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations
Choosing the Flag in the Name of Peace
Trade Potential and UN Peacekeeping Participation
Election Accomplished
Peacekeeper Fatalities and Force Commitments to UN Operations
Financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, 1990–2010
Sticking it out
Status from fighting? Reassessing the relationship between conflict involvement and diplomatic rank
Whitewashing and extortion
Nowhere to go? Why do some civil wars generate more refugees than others
A price for peace
Burden sharing in UN peacekeeping operations
Female rebels and United Nations peacekeeping deployments
Power in Peacekeeping
Where there’s a will, there’s a way
Examining UN PKO contributions at multiple levels
Diplomats in uniform – the evolution of Rwanda’s foreign policy and how it became indispensable within a decade
Refugee gravitation
Supporting rebels and hosting refugees
Peace and security ad hoc coalitions
A Spatial Model of Internal Displacement and Forced Migration
Government-Sponsored Mass Killing and Civil War Reoccurrence
Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations
Voted out
Mapping blue helmets
Do UN peace operations help forcibly displaced people
Democratization and Troop Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping
Triangulating Peace
Enforcing the Peace
Providing Peacekeepers
International Military Alliances, 1648-2008
Civil Wars and Foreign Powers
Does Peacekeeping Work?
Peace Operations
The Logic of Political Survival
Partnering for Troop Supply
United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments, 1990–2011
Territorial Changes, 1816–1996
What determines US humanitarian intervention
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
Eugene
Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations
Sources of Humanitarian Intervention
The Liberian conflict and the Ecowas-UN partnership
The New UN Peacekeeping
National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN
Determining the Causes of Irredentism
Choosing to Intervene
Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict
Back to the Future
Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers
Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention
Maintaining System Stability
Uniting for Peace
Military Famine, Human Rights, and Child Hunger
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Civil War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions1
Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-20021
Comparative Public Health
Intervention and Democracy
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Refugees and the Spread of Civil War
The Externalities of Civil Strife
United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War
Civil Wars and Economic Growth
UN peace operations and protection of civilians
UN Peace-Keeping
African peacekeeping in Africa
Supplying peace
No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955
International Peacebuilding
Civil Wars Kill and Maim People-Long After the Shooting Stops
Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action
Peacekeeping in Africa
| Unique citing works | 38 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,8 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 38 |