Forthcoming youth bulge in Egypt

Possible Sociopolitical Implications

Bibliographic Data

ID3979343
AuthorsAndrey Korotayev (0000-0003-3014-2037, Center for Stability and Risk Analysis, HSE University, Moscow, Russia, corresponding author), Julia Zinkina (0000-0003-0524-2140, International Laboratory of Demography and Human Capital, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia)
Year2024
Volume29
Issue5
Pages841-860
Publication date2024-09-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of North African Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1362-9387 • E-ISSN: 1743-9345
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13629387.2023.2247992
OpenAlexW4386098717
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited40

The increased proportion of youth aged 15–24 or 15–29 in total or adult population has long been shown to influence the intensity of sociopolitical destabilisation in general and political violence in particular. Youth bulges played an important role in the destabilising processes of the Arab Spring. We show that the influence of youth bulges in Egypt (and North Africa in general) is far from being limited to historical events. The demographic dynamics of Egypt (and a number of other North African countries) implies the emergence of new youth bulges in the future. We proceed to discuss this phenomenon and its sociopolitical implications. The period of the eve of the Arab Spring and the beginning of the 2010s was accompanied by the strengthening of the influence of Islamists in all countries of North Africa and in many Arab countries of Asia, which was likely associated with a period of significant growth of fertility rates in these countries. This surge in fertility rates generated those youth bulges that are confidently forecasted in these countries for the 2030s. It cannot be ruled out that in the 2030s Egypt (and North Africa in general) will experience a new destabilisation wave, which will be a kind of echo of the wave of the late 2000s – early 2010s.KEYWORDS: Youth bulgeSociopolitical destabilisationEgyptNorth AfricaFertility dynamicsIslamism Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 We have chosen Egypt among the North African countries because of the importance of this country and because its demographic statistics are the best among them.2 But also, as fertility is still high, the number of youth will continue to grow substantially for another generation.3 Note that this operationalisation of youth bulges has been also accepted by Peter Turchin (Citation2013, Citation2016; Turchin and Korotayev Citation2020).4 At the same time, it is the proportion of young people in the total population, and not just in the adult population, that can play a role. The share of youth in the total population is a destabilising parameter (Collier and Hoeffler Citation2004; Huntington Citation1996), but this indicator seems to neutralise the role of youth in societies with a particularly high birth rate (Urdal Citation2004), since in these societies the share of young people in the total population is relatively low due to the very large number of young children (despite the fact that the latter, it would seem, is unlikely can play any stabilising role). Subsequently, this latter operationalisation (proposed by Urdal Citation2004) became very widespread (see, for example: Farzanegan and Witthuhn Citation2017; Nordås and Davenport Citation2013) and began to prevail. However, the earlier operationalisation (proposed by Huntington – Collier – Hoffler) also has a right to exist. Indeed, since most young people have fewer family and career commitments, they are relatively easy to mobilise to engage in social or political conflict (Goldstone Citation2002, 11). However, in societies with very high fertility, young people will have very serious family obligations even before marriage, due to their very large number of younger siblings. A really large number of young people who are free from family obligations appears just when the period of increased birth rate is replaced by a period of its noticeable decline, as a result of which a relatively large number of young people exists against the backdrop of not only a relatively small number of older adults, but also a relatively small number of children (that is, younger sisters and brothers of numerous young people). This situation will correspond to a particularly high proportion of young people in the total population, and not just the adult population. Thus, the operationalisation of the youth bulge by Huntington – Collier – Hoeffler turns out to be no less justified than the operationalisation of Urdal.5 We rely on the following definition of Islamism: 'Islamism is a political trend and ideology, widespread in Muslim, especially Arab countries. Islamism is based on the idea of placing a high value (or even superiority) on the rules and traditions of Islam, on the need to build life (in varying degrees) in accordance with variously understood principles of Islam; it is oriented at the organizing politically around people who put some Islamic (or interpreted as Islamic) ideas and principles at the center of political life' (Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch Citation2019, 64).6 Except for the zones of substantial presence of foreigners.Additional informationFundingThis work is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the HSE University in 2023 with support by the Russian Science Foundation: [Grant Number 21-18-00123

Development economics · Economics · Fertility · Geography · Political science · Politics · Population · Sociology · Demography · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence · World Systems and Global Transformations

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