A resurgence of authoritarianism in Morocco, or preservation of the status quo

Bibliographic Data

ID3979558
AuthorsAisha Kadaoui (0009-0006-6908-4355, Department, of Public Law, University Hassan II, Casablanca, Morocco, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume28
Issue6
Pages1402-1424
Publication date2023-11-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of North African Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1362-9387 • E-ISSN: 1743-9345
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13629387.2023.2203470
OpenAlexW4366778330
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited15

This essay investigates the rise of authoritarianism in Morocco and its resurgence despite several reforms implemented by the Moroccan regime. The author provides a new perspective on democracy and democratic transformation whilst also considering the political regime's particularities, such as the constitutional imprints, the political configuration, and cultural history. The research questions are addressed with a focus on the 2011 constitutional reform. We will offer an original perspective on democracy and democratisation in Morocco, considering the fact that the latter is employed as a vast political framework for demonstrating international conformity and, legitimising authority and institutions. This essay investigates the resurgence of authoritarianism in Morocco despite the several reforms implemented by the Moroccan regime since the independence of the country in 1956.KEYWORDS: Democratisationauthoritarianismmonarchical supremacysocial unreststatus quopolitical reform Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Chris Zambleis notes, 'Liberalization can and often does occur in authoritarian systems without leading to a democratic transition ... In the Middle East, political liberalization has traditionally been part of a regime-driven survival strategy. In this sense, liberalization is an attempt by the ruling power to defuse or preempt social, economic, or political crises to offset popular dissatisfaction with the government' (Citation2005, 90–91).2 Respectively, Parti de la Justice et du Développement & Rassemblement National des Indépendants.3 According to the democratic index published by The Economist, less than half the world lives in a democracy. The coronavirus pandemic has undermined democracy and increased a return to authoritarianism in many states. https://www.economistgroup.com/group-news/economist-intelligence/democracy-index-2021-less-than-half-the-world-lives-in-a-democracy.4 'Hassan II, La mémoire d'un Roi', Entretiens avec Eric Laurent, Librairie Plon, 1993.5 Union socialiste des forces populaires.6 The alternation did not really change the political scene, nor did it consist of a rupture with the Hassan II regime. Moreover, referring to the consensus as an alternation raises questions. It would be reasonable to say that alternation is a process that results from the ballot box, thus giving the opposition parties space for political manoeuvering that allows them to concretise their political projects, also allowing for a rotation of power. This has not been the case in Morocco, where the King has appointed his prime minister without reference to the polls. Thus, this 'Moroccan-style' alternation had to meet a number of monarchical conditions and restrictions.7 By dynastic transition, we mean a change of vision and policy, and do not refer to a political or democratic transition. Although the vision has changed, the regime and its institutions remained stable and unchangeable, once again highlighting the particularity of Moroccan politics and its non-conformity with the paradigm of democratic transition.8 Moroccan society experienced the emergence of several protest movements throughout the 90s. The 20 février mouvement was then seen by the monarchy as an opportunity to consolidate the monarchic vision and legitimacy, instrumentalising, the movement's popularity and the media bubble that has accompanied it to do so.9 The young protesters criticised systemic and widespread corruption, demanded social justice, access to employment, as well as the departure of some political figures, without calling for the abolition of the monarchy. They also used the Arab uprisings as a justification for their movement and to gain popularity. These demands were considered red lines up to the formation of the mouvement du 20 février, particularly as they related to the monarchy and its sanctity.10 Discours prononcé par le roi lors de l'installation du CES, le 21 Février 2011. http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/texte-int%C3%A9gral-du-discours-de-sm-le-roi-loccasion-de-la-c%C3%A9r%C3%A9monie-dinstallation-du.11 'This process, we started it as soon as our accession to the Throne, in perfect communion with all the living forces of the Nation. And it is thanks to it, in fact, that we managed, three months after the launching of the constitutional revision process, to finalise a new democratic constitutional chart' (Monarchial speech of 17 June 2011).12 An examination of the preceding constitutional articles reveals that, in addition to shared competencies, the King retains exclusivity in certain areas. Through Article 59, he can also put the government on hold indefinitely. The monarchy has never used its supra-parliamentary prerogatives since 2011. However, governmental deadlock in 2016 resulting from the appointment of Abdelilah Benkirane, and his inability to form a government, compelled the King to use his prerogative of arbitration to ensure the proper functioning of constitutional institutions.13 The king's actions are not subject to any appeal or debate by virtue of article 95 of the constitution, which gives the King the prerogative to demand that Parliament re-read a law, without this act being denied by the legislative institution 'The King may demand a new reading in Parliament ... The request for a new reading shall be formulated by message ... This new reading may not be refused' (Art. 95.cst 2011).14 'Political parties contribute to the organization and representation of citizens. There cannot be a single party in Morocco' (Article 3, cst).15 El Hassan Lechguer, deputy of the USFP and member of the finance commission, Intervention in a conference on 'uncertainity and fiscal policy', Centre universitaire LINKS, Friday 24th February 2023

Authoritarianism · Democracy · Democratization · Development economics · Economics · Liberalization · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Status quo · African Studies and Ethnography · African Studies and Geopolitics · Law · Multiculturalism, Politics, Migration, Gender

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