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Protecting Competition in the American Economy

Merger Control, Tech Titans, Labor Markets

Bibliographic Data

ID4029903
AuthorsCarl Shapiro (0000-0003-4430-3655, Carl Shapiro is a Professor at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, California. He served as the chief economist at the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice during 1995–1996 and 2011–2013 and as a member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during 2011–2012. He has also served as an economic consultant for the government and for private parties on a variety of antitrust matters over the years., corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume33
Issue3
Pages69-93
Publication date2019-08-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965
PublisherAmerican Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1257/jep.33.3.69
OpenAlexW3123766531
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited17

Accumulating evidence points to the need for more vigorous antitrust enforcement in the United States in three areas. First, stricter merger control is warranted in an economy where large, highly efficient and profitable "superstar" firms account for an increasing share of economic activity. Evidence from merger retrospectives further supports the conclusion that stricter merger control is needed. Second, greater vigilance is needed to prevent dominant firms, including the tech titans, from engaging in exclusionary conduct. The systematic shrinking of the scope of the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court over the past 40 years may make this difficult. Third, greater antitrust scrutiny should be given to the monopsony power of employers in labor markets

Business · Economics · Enforcement · Labour economics · Market economy · Market power · Merger control · Monopoly · Monopsony · Political science · Scrutiny · Supreme court · Global trade and economics · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy · Finance

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Citations per year0.8
Citation span2021 - 2026 (6)
Highly citedNo

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