Non-Humeantheories of natural necessity

Bibliographic Data

ID4079157
AuthorsTyler Hildebrand (0000-0002-5799-7134, Dalhousie University, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume15
Issue5
Publication date2020-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12662
OpenAlexW3016412186
LanguageEN
Citations received18
References cited91

Non-Humean theories of natural necessity invoke modally-laden primitives to explain why nature exhibits lawlike regularities. However, they vary in the primitives they posit and in their subsequent accounts of laws of nature and related phenomena (including natural properties, natural kinds, causation, counterfactuals, and the like). This article provides a taxonomy of non-Humean theories, discusses influential arguments for and against them, and describes some ways in which differences in goals and methods can motivate different versions of non-Humeanism (and, for that matter, Humeanism). In short, this article provides an introduction to non-Humeanism concerning the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural necessity

Causation · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Natural kind · Natural law · Evolution and Science Education · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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