Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought

Bibliographic Data

ID4079199
AuthorsJustin Snedegar (0000-0002-2552-0702)
Year2015
Volume10
Issue6
Pages379-388
Publication date2015-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12231
OpenAlexW1897316894
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited27

Contrastivismabout some concept says that the concept is relativized to sets of alternatives. Relative to some alternatives, the concept may apply, but relative to others, it may not. This article explores contrastivism about the central normative concepts of reasons and ought. Contrastivism about reasons says that a consideration may be a reason for an actionArather than one alternative,B, but may not be a reason forArather than some other alternative,C. Likewise, contrastivism about ought says that it might be that you ought to perform actionArather than actionB, while it is not the case that you ought to performArather than some other alternative,C. It explores the shape and motivations for, and the relationship between, these contrastivist theories

Action (physics · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Normative · Physics · Positive economics · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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